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Abstract
Data deduplication is an attractive technology to reduce storage space for increasing
vast amount of duplicated and redundant data. In a cloud storage system with
data deduplication, duplicate copies of data will be eliminated and only one copy
will be kept in the storage. To protect the conﬁdentiality of sensitive data while
supporting deduplication, the convergent encryption technique has been proposed
to encrypt the data before outsourcing. However, the issue of keyword search over
encrypted data in deduplication storage system has to be addressed for eﬃcient
data utilization. This paper ﬁrstly proposes two constructions which support secure
keyword search in this scenario. In these constructions, the integrity of the data can
be realized by just checking the convergent key, without other traditional integrity
auditing mechanisms. Then, two extensions are presented to support fuzzy keyword
search and block-level deduplication. Finally, security analysis is given.
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1 Introduction
Data deduplication is a technique for reducing the size of data in storage
systems by detecting and eliminating redundant data and has been widely
employed for data backup to minimize network and storage overhead. The
system will perform duplicates for incoming data and does not record the
data if it matches the existing stored data and refers other redundant data to
that copy.
There have been a number of deduplication systems proposed with various
deduplication strategies such as ﬁle-level or block-level deduplications depend-
ing on the size of deduplication. It can also be divided into inline deduplication
system and post-process deduplication system, which performs deduplication
before or after storing them respectively. Especially, with the advent of cloud
storage, data deduplication techniques attracts more and more attention from
both academic and industrial community. It has become one of critical tech-
niques for the management of the ever-increasing volume of data in the infor-
mation society. According to the analysis report of IDC, the volume of data in
the world is expected to reach 40 trillion gigabytes in 2020 [2] with very high
increasing speed. Today’s commercial cloud storage services, such as Dropbox,
Mozy, and Memopal, have been applying deduplication to save the network
bandwidth and the storage cost with client-side deduplication.
To protect the conﬁdentiality of outsourced data, the notion of convergent en-
cryption [3] has been proposed. With the convergent encryption, the conﬁden-
tiality of data can be achieved while realizing deduplication. In the deduplica-
tion system based on convergent encryption, the data will be encrypted/decrypted
with a convergent key which is derived by computing the hash value of the
content of data copy itself [3–5]. With this novel technique, identical data
copies will generate the same convergent key and be encrypted into the same
ciphertext, which allows the cloud to perform deduplication on the ciphertexts.
However, data encryption makes eﬀective data utilization to be diﬃcult given
that there could be a large amount of outsourced data ﬁles. The keyword
search over encrypted data in cloud computing has been proposed in recent
years [6–12] and popularly used to selectively retrieve ﬁles of interest. Through
this technique, both the data and keyword are encrypted such that privacy of
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keyword information will be also achieved besides the conﬁdentiality of data.
In a searchable encryption scheme, an index will be built by the data owner
for each ﬁle or each keyword, which is then uploaded to the cloud server with
the encrypted data. By integrating the trapdoors of keywords within the index
information, eﬀective keyword search can be realized while both ﬁle content
and keyword privacy are well-preserved.
Although such a technique allows the cloud server to perform search on be-
half of user without knowing the information of the ﬁle or the keywords, the
existing searchable encryption techniques have not been considered in a dedu-
plication storage system with additional duplicate check and deduplication
storage phases.
In this paper, we show how to construct secure deduplication systems with key-
word search in cloud computing. We also formalize the security model for the
encrypted keyword search in deduplication systems. Both the keyword privacy
and content privacy can be achieved in the constructions. In our constructions,
two kinds of index for keyword search have been proposed and analyzed. The
integrity of the uploaded ﬁles could be veriﬁed by the users after downloading
and decryption without any other traditional integrity auditing mechanisms.
Such a property is achieved based on the technique of convergent encryption.
The security analysis is also given under the proposed security model.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the system model
and security requirements of the keyword search in deduplication storage sys-
tem. In Section 3, the building blocks required in this paper are presented.
Our constructions are described in Section 4 and Section 5. The security and
performance analysis is given in Section 6. The related work is described in
Section 7. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 8.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 System Model
In this paper, we consider a cloud storage system consisting of data owner,
data user and cloud storage server. The ﬁles are assumed to be encrypted by
the data owner before uploading to the cloud storage server. We assume the
authorization between the data owner and users is appropriately done with
some authentication and key-issuing protocols. After uploading the encrypted
ﬁles, authorized users are allowed to perform the keyword search on these
encrypted data with the aid of cloud server. In more details, an authorized
user sends a request to selectively retrieve data ﬁles of his/her interest. Upon
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receiving the request, the cloud storage server is responsible for pinpointing
a set of ﬁles matching the searching request. All the matched ﬁle ID will be
returned to the user as the searching result. Both client-side deduplication and
server-side deduplication are supported in our system.
• Data owner. The data owner is an entity that outsources data storage to the
storage server and access the data later. In a client-side data deduplication
system, only the ﬁrst data owner of a ﬁle needs to upload while the following
data owners of the same ﬁle does not require to upload the duplicate data
any more.
• Users. The entity of users in the deduplication systems makes registration
at cloud storage server and has privileges to access some data ﬁles shared
by some data owners.
• Cloud storage server. The cloud storage server is an entity that provides
the data storage service for the users. Furthermore, the cloud storage server
will also perform duplicate check before users upload their ﬁles. If there is
identical content stored in cloud storage server, the users are not required
to upload the ﬁle again, which can reduce the storage cost at the server side
and save the upload bandwidth at user side.
Both ﬁle-level and block-level deduplications are supported in our system. To
upload a ﬁle, a user ﬁrst performs the ﬁle-level duplicate check. If the ﬁle
is a duplicate, then all its blocks must be duplicates as well; otherwise, the
user further performs the block-level duplicate check and identiﬁes the unique
blocks to be uploaded. Each data copy is associated with a tag for the duplicate
check, which is computed with a hash function on the data ﬁle.
2.2 Adversary Model
We consider a semi-trusted cloud storage server in our deduplication storage
system. To prevent the cloud storage server from getting sensitive informa-
tion, data ﬁles are encrypted before uploading by the data owners. The the
cloud server will honestly follow our protocol and may try to derive other
sensitive information from users’ search requests. Thus, besides the conﬁden-
tiality of data, the privacy of the keyword search should also be carefully be
protected. In another word, the keyword search should be conducted in a se-
cure manner that allows data ﬁles to be securely retrieved while revealing as
little information as possible to the cloud server. For deduplication storage
system supporting keyword search, we will follow the security deﬁnition de-
ployed in the traditional searchable encryption [13] and deduplicaiton system.
More speciﬁcally, it is required that nothing should be leaked from the re-
motely stored ﬁles and index beyond the outcome and the pattern of search
queries. Furthermore, we only consider the semantic security when the ﬁles
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are unpredicatable, that is, the ﬁles with high min-entropy. Actually, this re-
quirement has recently been formalized in [14] and called the privacy against
chosen distribution attack. This also implies that the data is secure against the
adversary who does not own the data. The cloud storage server can obtain the
knowledge of encrypted data and encrypted keyword in the search request. Its
goal is to obtain some sensitive information from these obtained knowledge.
To break the security of data from a data owner, the cloud storage server is
able to collude with the other unauthorized users.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, some tools and notions are introduced in our construction,
including the Bloom ﬁlter and trapdoors of keywords, message authentication
code and convergent encryption. These preliminaries are utilized to design
keyword search and encryption in this paper.
Bloom Filter A Bloom ﬁlter [15] is utilized to prove membership of a set
S = {s1, · · · , sn} with n elements. It is represented by an array of m bits,
where each bit is initially set to 0. The ﬁlter uses r independent hash func-
tions h1, · · · , hr, where hi : {0, 1} → [1,m] for i ∈ [1, r]. For each element
s ∈ S, the array bits at positions h1(s), · · · , hr(s) are set to 1. To deter-
mine if an element w belongs to the set S, we check the bits at positions
h1(w), · · · , hr(w). w is considered to be a member of the set S if all the
checked bits are 1′s with some probability of a false positive. In particular, for
keyword w with m-bit array Bloom ﬁlter, the probability of a false positive f
is f = (1− (1− 1/m)r|Swi |)r ≈ (1− e−r|Swi |/m)r. False positives occur because
each location may have also been set by some element other than w. On the
other hand, if any checked bits are 0, then w deﬁnitely does not belong to S.
Trapdoors of Keywords Trapdoors of the keywords can be realized by
applying a one-way function f , which could be deﬁned as a hash function.
Given a keyword w and a secret key sk, the trapdoor of w could be computed
as Tw = f(sk, w). The trapdoors of keywords constructed in this way achieves
trapdoor privacy. It means that if a user who has not been assigned searching
privilege, cannot get any information of the keywords underlying the search
requests or index.
Message authentication code. A message authentication code (MAC) is
a short piece of information used to authenticate a message and to provide
integrity and authenticity assurances on the message. In our construction, the
message authentication code is applied to achieve the integrity of the out-
sourced stored ﬁles. It can be easily constructed with a keyed (cryptographic)
hash function, which takes input a secret key and an arbitrary-length ﬁle to be
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authenticated, and outputs a MAC. Only users with the same key generating
the MAC can verify the correctness of the MAC value and detect if the ﬁle
has been changed or not.
Convergent encryption Convergent encryption provides data conﬁdential-
ity in deduplication. The encryption key, which is called convergent key here,
is computed from data ﬁle. Then, the ﬁle is encrypted with such an con-
vergent key with symmetric encryptions. To support deduplication, a tag is
also computed for the ﬁle and used to detect duplicate by the cloud storage
server. If two data copies are the same, then their tags are the same. Note
that both the convergent key and the tag are independently derived, and the
tag cannot be used to deduce the convergent key and compromise data conﬁ-
dentiality. Formally, a convergent encryption scheme can be deﬁned with four
primitive functions: 1) the key generation algorithm KeyGen(M) → K maps
a data copy M to a convergent key K. We use a hash function H0(M) = K
as the computation of convergent encryption key, 2) the symmetric encryp-
tion Enc(K,M) → C takes both the convergent key K and the data copy
M as inputs and then outputs a ciphertext C, 3) the decryption algorithm
Dec(K,C) → M takes both the ciphertext C and the key K as inputs and
then outputsM , and 4) the tag generation algorithm can be deﬁned as another
hash function of M .
4 The Deduplication System Supporting Keyword Search
4.1 A Basic Construction
The main idea of the construction is based on traditional keyword search
mechanism. Given a collection of N data ﬁles F = (F1, F2, . . . , FN) stored in
the cloud server by a user, a set of distinct keywords W = {w1, w2, ..., wp} is
deﬁned for these ﬁles. Upon receiving a searching request w, the storage server
will search and return a set of ﬁle IDs whose corresponding data ﬁles contain
the word w, denoted as FIDw. That is, for each keyword w, the corresponding
ﬁle ID set FIDw is stored. The main idea of keyword search for encrypted data
is similar to the plaintext except that each keyword is replaced with f(sk, w),
where sk is the user’s private key. Note that in this storage system, the user
can only search the ﬁles belonging to himself with his own private key sk.
In this section, we start with some straightforward solutions, the analysis of
which will motivate us to develop more eﬃcient and secure ones. Speciﬁcally,
the scheme goes as follows:
System setup. Deﬁne the security parameter as 1λ and initialize a convergent
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encryption scheme. Assume there are N encrypted data ﬁles C = (CF1 , CF2 ,. . .,
CFN ) stored in the cloud server by a user, where kF = H0(F ) and CF =
EncCE(kF , F ). The user also deﬁnes a set of distinct keywordsW = {w1, w2, ..., wp}.
The user also builds an index for these ﬁles as follows. For each keyword
wi ∈ W , the user computes trapdoor Twi = f(sk, wi) with secret key sk and
attaches FIDwi . Assume that {CF , F IDwi} has been stored on the cloud by
the user.
File Upload. To upload a ﬁle F , the user interacts the cloud storage server
and tests if there is any duplicated copy stored in the cloud storage server. A
ﬁle tag φF = H(F ) will be computed and sent to the cloud server for the ﬁle
duplicate check.
• If a duplicate is found by the storage server, the user will be assigned a
pointer, which allows him to access the ﬁle.
• Otherwise, if no duplicate is found, the user computes the encrypted ﬁle
CF = EncCE(kF , F ) with the convergent key kF = H0(F ) and uploads CF
to the cloud server. The user also encrypts the convergent key kF with a
symmetric encryption key sk and gets the ciphertext CkF = Enc(sk, kF ),
which is also uploaded to the cloud server.
After this phase, the user goes into the index building phase. That is, for each
keyword w belonging to F , the data owner computes trapdoors Tw = f(sk, w)
with secret key sk. Then he uploads the trapdoors {Tw} and identity of F
to the cloud storage server. Upon receiving the updating request, the storage
server updates the user’s index by adding the trapdoor and corresponding ﬁle
identity if there is no such a trapdoor; otherwise, the cloud server just adds
the ﬁle identity to the FIDw.
Keyword search. Assume a user wants to search ﬁles containing keyword w.
Then he ﬁrst computes and sends a trapdoor for this keyword as T (w) =
f(sk, w) with his secret key sk. Upon receiving the search request, the cloud
storage server ﬁrst compares Tw with the index and returns the searching re-
sult as FIDw if there exists a match. Otherwise, a symbol ⊥ is returned.
File Retrieving. Suppose a user wants to download a ﬁle F . It ﬁrst sends
a request and the ﬁle names to the cloud storage server. Upon receiving the
request and ﬁle names, the cloud storage server will check whether the user is
eligible to download the ﬁles. If failed, the cloud storage server sends back an
abort signal to the user to indicate the download failure. Otherwise, the cloud
server returns the corresponding ciphertexts {CF} and {CkF }. Upon receiving
the encrypted data from the cloud server, the user decrypts and gets the keys
{kF} by using sk stored locally. With the convergent keys, the user is able to
recover the original ﬁles {F}. Then, the user also veriﬁes the ﬁles by checking
if H0(F ) = kF . If yes, then the user accepts this ﬁle; otherwise, the ﬁle will be
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rejected because it cannot pass the integrity veriﬁcation.
4.2 Another Construction based on Bloom Filter
In this section, we show how to utilize the Bloom ﬁlter [15] to represent the
keyword set for each ﬁle. More speciﬁcally, the trapdoor set {Tw}w∈F is in-
serted into ﬁle F ’s Bloom ﬁlter as the index stored on the server. Now by
binding the ﬁle identiﬁers FID to F ’s Bloom ﬁlter, a per ﬁle index is gener-
ated to track the data ﬁles.
System setup. The description of system setup is similar to the basic con-
struction. Assume there are N encrypted data ﬁles C = (CF1 , CF2 , . . . , CFN )
stored in the cloud server by a user with convergent encryption. The user also
builds an index for these ﬁles as follows. For each ﬁle F , the user computes
trapdoors Twi = f(sk, wi) with secret key sk for all keywords in this ﬁle. Then,
these trapdoors are inserted into ﬁle F ’s Bloom ﬁlter as the index stored on
the server, binding with the ﬁle identity FID.
File Upload. To upload a ﬁle F , the user performs the duplicate check as the
basic construction, which is omitted here. After the duplicate check phase,
the user starts the index building phase. That is, the data owner computes
trapdoors Tw = f(sk, w) with secret key sk. Then he uploads these trapdoors
and identity of F to the cloud storage server. After receiving these trapdoors,
the cloud storage server inserts each of them into the Bloom ﬁlter for F and
keeps the updated Bloom ﬁlter as the index for F.
Keyword search. Upon receiving the search request Tw from a user with secret
key sk, the server tests which Bloom ﬁlters contain 1’s in all r locations and
returns the search results, where we assume that there are r independent hash
functions h1, . . . , hr used in the construction of Bloom ﬁlter.
Note that the search cost associated with this solution is O(|N |), where N is
the number of data ﬁles.
File Retrieving. The description of ﬁle retrieving is the same as the basic
construction and we omit it here for simplicity.
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5 Advanced Deduplication Storage Systems
5.1 A Two-Level Deduplication System
In a scalable system, the storage size for the index of keywords is also very
huge, especially when the number of users and ﬁles is large. To utilize the
deduplication with keyword search, it is critical to support the fuzzy search
property. In the previous related work, there are many results that discussed
the storage size of such keyword index. Furthermore, to realize the fuzzy key-
word search with better utilization of outsourced data, this problem becomes
even worse. The trivial straightforward approach by just listing all the possi-
ble keywords within some distance, apparently provides fuzzy keyword search
over the encrypted ﬁles. However, this approach has serious eﬃciency disad-
vantages. The simple enumeration method in constructing fuzzy keyword sets
would introduce large storage complexities, which greatly aﬀect the usabil-
ity. Recall that in the deﬁnition of edit distance, substitution, deletion and
insertion are three kinds of operations in computation of edit distance. The
numbers of all similar words of wi satisfying ed(wi, w
′
i) ≤ d for d = 1, 2 and 3
are approximately 2k×26, 2k2×262, and 4
3
k3×263, respectively. When assume
that the output length of hash function is 160 bits, the resulted storage cost
for the index will be 30GB. Recently, Li et al. [6] propose another solution to
construct eﬃcient fuzzy keyword sets with smaller size. Even if this novel so-
lution is eﬃcient, for system with huge number of users, the storage overhead
for these indexes is also very big. To support the scalability in a deduplication
system supporting keyword search, we consider how to design a deduplication
system with two-level deduplication. That is, the new system can not only
support deduplication with ﬁle content, but also realize the deduplication for
index.
Main idea. To protect the privacy of keyword from the keyword search request
and index, the keywords are always pre-computed by combining some private
key owned by the users, for example, the hash value on the private key and
the keyword. Thus, diﬀerent users with diﬀerent private keys results diﬀerent
indexes. In the previous work, even the index can be the same for users in the
same group with the same private key, they still have to upload these same
values to the servers without deduplication technique. Thus, in this Section,
we will show how to combine the keyword search with the deduplication in
order to save the storage and uploading bandwidth. A private cloud server
will be introduced, who will be in charge of the generation of all the trapdoor
of keyword. In this way, the same trapdoor will be generated for all the users
with the same keyword. Furthermore, the information for the keyword can be
protected. The private cloud server is assumed to be trusted and honest.
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Before giving the construction, some preliminaries are given below.
Edit Distance There are several traditional ways to quantitatively measure
the string similarity. We will use the edit distance [16] as [6]. The edit dis-
tance ed(w1, w2) between two words w1 and w2 is the number of operations
required to transform one of them into the other. The three primitive oper-
ations are listed as follow, substitution: changing one character to another;
deletion: deleting one character from a word; insertion: inserting a single char-
acter into a word. Based on the three primitives, we can deﬁne the following
set for a word: Given a keyword w, let Sw,d denote the set of words w
′ satisfying
ed(w,w′) ≤ d for a certain integer d.
Fuzzy Keyword Search Using edit distance, the deﬁnition of fuzzy keyword
search can be formulated as follows: Given a collection of n encrypted data
ﬁles C = (F1,F2, . . . ,Fn) stored in the cloud server, a predeﬁned set of distinct
keyword set W , a provided search request (w, d) for w with a speciﬁed edit
distance d, the execution of fuzzy keyword search returns a set of ﬁle IDs whose
corresponding data ﬁles possibly contain w: if w = wi ∈ W , then just return
FIDwi , which denotes the identiﬁer containing wi; otherwise, if w ∈ W , then
return {FIDwi}, where ed(w,wi) ≤ d. In other words, the system returns all
the ﬁles containing the search request itself if there is an exact match among
W ; otherwise, return all the possible ﬁles with the keywords falling within the
speciﬁed edit distance. In fact, d can be diﬀerent for distinct keywords and the
system will return {FIDwi} satisfying ed(w,wi) ≤ min{k, d} if exact match
fails.
Next, we describe the construction for the deduplication supporting fuzzy key-
word search.
Similar to the above constructions, we also need to deﬁne the security parame-
ter. We also assume that there areN encrypted data ﬁles C = (CF1 , CF2 , . . . , CFN )
stored in the cloud server by a user. For these ﬁles, there are a set of distinct
keywords W = {w1, w2, ..., wp}. The private cloud server keeps two private
keys sk,K, which will be used to compute the trapdoor of keyword and con-
vergent keys.
Index Upload. In the index building phase, for each keyword wi ∈ W , the
user sends the keyword and corresponding ﬁle identiﬁers to the private cloud
server. The private cloud server ﬁrst computes the fuzzy keyword set Swi,d
and computes trapdoors Tw′i = f(sk, w
′
i) for all w
′
i ∈ Swi,d with secret key sk.
These trapdoors will be sent to cloud servers. The cloud servers ﬁrst check if
there is an identical fuzzy set stored. If there is, then, the corresponding index
will not be stored again by the storage server; If there is only a subset that
is identical with the values stored in the cloud, then, the duplicate will be
only stored once. For the above cases, the corresponding ﬁle identiﬁers need
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to be returned to the private cloud server, who will ﬁrst decrypt to get the
ﬁle identiﬁers and the new ﬁle identiﬁers will be added and updated. Finally,
the updated encrypted ﬁle identiﬁer is sent to the storage server. Otherwise,
the private cloud server computes Enc(sk,FIDwi‖wi) and outsources the index
table {{Tw′i}w′i∈Swi,d ,Enc(sk,FIDwi‖wi)}.
File Upload. After uploading the index, the user will start to upload each
ﬁle F . First, the user interacts with the cloud storage server. That is, a ﬁle
tag φF = H(F ) will be computed and sent to the private cloud server, who
will sent back φF,K = H(H(F ), K) to the user. This tag generation method is
similar to [17], which is used to prevent from the brute-force attack launched
by the public cloud server or dishonest users. Then, the tag value φF,K is sent
to the storage server for duplicate check.
• If a duplicate is found by the storage server, the user will be assigned a
pointer, which allows him to access the ﬁle.
• Otherwise, if no duplicate is found, the user computes the encrypted ﬁle
CF = EncCE(kF , F ) with the convergent key kF = H(H0(F ), K) and uploads
CF to the cloud server. Note that the convergent key kF is also generated
by the private cloud server with his secret key K. The user also encrypts
the convergent key kF with a symmetric encryption key sku and gets the
ciphertext CkF = Enc(sku, kF ), which is also uploaded to the cloud server.
Keyword search. Assume that an authorized user types in w as the searching
input, with the pre-set edit distance k. The input is ﬁrst transformed to a
fuzzy set Sw,k based on the same rule utilized by the data owner above. Then,
with this fuzzy set, the private cloud server will ﬁrst compute the trapdoors
{Tw′}w′∈Sw,k for each element w′ ∈ Sw,k with his private key sk. Then, the hash
values are sent to the public cloud storage server as the searching request.
Upon receiving the searching request, the storage server ﬁrst compares these
hash values with the index and returns the search result as Enc(sk,FIDw‖w)
if there exists an exact match. The private cloud server ﬁrst decrypts the ci-
phertext and then sends the ﬁle identiﬁers FIDw‖w back to the user.
File Retrieving. After above searching request, suppose that a user wants to
download a ﬁle F . It ﬁrst sends a request and the ﬁle names to the cloud
storage server. Upon receiving the request and ﬁle names, the cloud storage
server will check whether the user is eligible to download the ﬁles. If failed,
the cloud storage server sends back an abort signal to the user to indicate the
download failure. Otherwise, the cloud server returns the corresponding ci-
phertexts {CF} and {CkF }. Upon receiving the encrypted data from the cloud
server, the user decrypts and gets the keys {kF} by using sku stored locally.
With the convergent keys, the user is able to recover the original ﬁles {F}.
Then, the user also veriﬁes the ﬁles by checking if H0(F ) = kF . If yes, then
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the user accepts this ﬁle; otherwise, the ﬁle will be rejected because it cannot
pass the integrity veriﬁcation.
5.2 Block-Level Deduplicaton Scheme
We only discuss the keyword search in ﬁle-level deduplication system in Sec-
tion 4. However, it is easy to extend the above constructions into block-level
deduplication supporting key word search. Note that the keyword search is
still performed over ﬁles. In this section, we show how to achieve the keyword
search in block-level deduplication. In a block-level deduplication system, the
user should still ﬁrstly perform the ﬁle-level deduplication. The block-level
deduplication will be performed if and only if no duplicate is found. In more
details, the user divides this ﬁle into blocks and performs block-level dedupli-
cation. The system setup is the same as the ﬁle-level deduplication system,
except the block size parameter will be deﬁned additionally. Next, we give the
details of the algorithms of File Upload.
File Upload. To upload a ﬁle F , the user ﬁrst performs the ﬁle-level deduplica-
tion. If a duplicate is found, the user will perform the ﬁle-level deduplication
as that in Section 4.
If no duplicate is found, the user performs the block-level deduplication as in
[18] by dividing F into a set of fragments {Bi}. For each Bi, the user performs
a block-level duplicate check by computing H(Bi), where the data processing
and duplicate check of block-level deduplication is the same as that of ﬁle-level
deduplication if the ﬁle F is replaced with block Bi. Thus, we omit it here.
The traditional deduplication method cannot prevent illegal data distribution
attack and side channel attack. To prevent the adversary from launching these
attacks, a new concept of Proof of Ownership (PoW) has been proposed [19],
which enables users to prove their ownership of data copies to the storage
server. PoW is implemented as an interactive algorithm. The user ﬁrst com-
putes a short hash value H(F ) from a ﬁle F and sends it to the cloud storage
server, who will challenge the user with some random chosen index values. If
the user could correctly answer these challenges, the proof is passed. Thus,
the PoW technique can be also applied in our construction to prevent the
deduplication systems from these attacks. Through integrating PoW in our
deduplication systems, we can achieve higher security.
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6 Security and Performance Analysis
6.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis for the deduplication system
with keyword search in Section 4. The security analysis for the other con-
structions is similar and thus omitted here. Some basic cryptographic tools
have been applied to in our construction achieve the deduplication protocol.
To show the security of this protocol, we assume that the underlying building
blocks are secure, including the message authentication code scheme and the
convergent encryption scheme. Thus, the security will be analyzed based on
the above security assumptions.
Completeness. In our constructions, the cloud storage server is assumed to be
honest and curious, which means that they will follow the protocols. Thus,
if the data ﬁles have been successfully uploaded and stored at servers with
correctly computed index, the data owner can retrieve them from the cloud
storage server. The ﬁles can be decrypted by the data owner with convergent
key based on the correctness of convergent encryption. Furthermore, the index
consisting of trapdoors of keywords for each ﬁle. Thus, if a data owner submits
a keyword search query to the cloud storage server, the exact match value will
be returned to the user after performing the keyword search in the cloud
server.
Search privacy. In our construction, the computation of index and request of
the same keyword is identical as f(sk, w) for a keyword w with secret key sk.
The access pattern privacy will not be considered in our systems, and thus we
will not take the frequency attack into our security analysis. The security of
search privacy is proven with reduction. In more details, suppose the search-
able encryption scheme fails to achieve the search privacy against the chosen
keyword. It means means there exists adversary who can get the underlying
information of keyword from the index. However, as we know, the trapdoor
is computed from a message authentication code. Then, based on such an ad-
versary, we are able to build an algorithm that utilizes the adversary to break
the security of message authentication code. This algorithm has an access to
an oracle that can answer the message authentication code on any message
m. The adversary can query the trapdoors for a set of keywords, which can
be simulated by our designed algorithm by querying the message authentica-
tion code oracle. After making these trapdoor queries, the adversary outputs
two challenge keywords w0 and w1. Our designed algorithm just chooses one
of them and sends it to the challenger to compute a message authentication
code. This challenge value will be sent back to the adversary. If the adver-
sary can eﬀectively guess which keyword is computed in the trapdoor, then
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our designed algorithm can also uses this guess as the output to the message
authentication code and break the security of the underlying message authen-
tication code. Therefore, based on the assumption of the security of message
authentication code, the adversary cannot get any valid information from the
trapdoor under the chosen trapdoor attack. Based on the above analysis, we
can get the security result of search privacy for our constructions.
For the construction of deduplication supporting fuzzy keyword search, the
technique in [6] is used, which has been proven secure with respect to the
keyword privacy under the corresponding security model. Thus, the searching
privacy can be achieved in a similar way. Note that in our security model,
the private cloud server is assumed to be trusted. It owns the private key and
all the keywords have been sent to the private cloud server for the generation
of trapdoors. Of course, even if the private cloud server is not honest, only
the privacy of keyword will be leaked and the ﬁle conﬁdentiality is still kept.
Thus, in this weaker security model, the security can be achieved similar to
the traditional deduplication system.
File conﬁdentiality. In the deduplication system, all the ﬁles have been en-
crypted by using the convergent encryption scheme. Furthermore, two kinds
of diﬀerent encryption methods have been applied in our two constructions.
In the ﬁrst construction, the data is encrypted with the traditional convergent
encryption scheme. The data encrypted with such encryption method cannot
achieve semantic security as it is inherently subject to brute-force attacks that
can recover ﬁles falling into a known set. The detailed security analysis on the
convergent encryption can be found in many related works, which is omitted
here.
We present the security analysis for the construction with private cloud server.
In this construction, the ﬁle content is not only computed by using the conver-
gent encryption key, but also the private key owned by the private cloud server
is embedded. In this way, the ciphertext is unpredictable even if the original ﬁle
is predictable. Furthermore, for the security analysis, two kinds of adversaries,
including external adversaries and internal adversaries, are analyzed. For the
internal adversaries, they are provided with some convergent encryption keys
additionally. However, these convergent encryption keys have no security im-
pact on the data conﬁdentiality because these convergent encryption keys are
computed with secret key K. And the secret key K is protected by the private
cloud server. Furthermore, the convergent key is encrypted by using the sym-
metric encryption with a key chosen randomly by the user. Thus, based on
the above analysis, the convergent key in our construction is not deterministic
in terms of the ﬁle, which still depends on the secret key stored by the private
cloud server and unknown to the adversary. As a result, if the private cloud
server is honest and does not collude with the adversary, the conﬁdentiality
of ﬁle is semantically secure for both predictable and unpredictable ﬁle.
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6.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, we show the evaluation for the eﬃciency of the given construc-
tions. The deduplication protocol is very similar to the previous related work
[18]. Thus, we only focus on the keyword search eﬃciency in this protocol.
Two kinds of time costs have been analyzed, that is, the time cost for the
construction of fuzzy keyword set and the time cost for fuzzy keyword search.
Our experiments are simulated with python 3.4. Note that in order to pre-
cisely measure the overhead at both server and user sides, All experiments
were performed on the same machine with Intel Core i5-3470 3.20 GHz CPU
and 4G memory running Linux.
(a) Time for fuzzy set construction (b) Time for fuzzy keyword search
Fig. 1. Execution time of Fuzzy Search
Two edit distances have been chosen for the experiment, that is, d = 1 and
d = 2. From the experiment, we can ﬁnd that the search eﬃciency is very
eﬃcient for both edit distance. From these two ﬁgure, we can ﬁnd that the
cost of constructing fuzzy keyword set under d = 1 is much less than the
case of d = 2. The reason is that it has much less elements in the ﬁrst case.
Actually, the eﬃciency can also be improved through the advanced techniques
such as trie-traverse search scheme, where a multi-way tree can be built for
storing the fuzzy keyword set. In more details, all trapdoors sharing a common
preﬁx may have common nodes. Based on this observation, the root of such
as tree is associated with an empty set and the trapdoor can be recovered
in a search from the root to the leaf that ends the trapdoor. Obviously, any
request for keyword search can be found by a depth-ﬁrst search in this tree.
The ﬁle identiﬁers, which have been encrypted, will be indexed according to
their names. Finally, these index information will be stored at the ending
node of the corresponding path. We also evaluate the search performance
as the number of keywords increases in Fig. 1, which demonstrates that the
average search time is very eﬃcient. And based on the experimental results,
the edit distance and the number of keywords aﬀect the searching eﬃciency.
Based on the theoretical results, the time for the construction of fuzzy set and
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searching grows with the number of the keywords and edit distance. However,
because of the utilization of fuzzy keyword set construction [6], the eﬃciency
is practical for applications. We can also get the result on the eﬃciency for
the exact match, which is more eﬃcient than that of fuzzy search. All the
results validate our eﬃciency analysis and demonstrate that our proposed
constructions are very eﬃcient and eﬀective supporting fuzzy keyword search
over encrypted data in cloud computing.
7 Related Work
Data deduplication techniques are very interesting techniques that are widely
employed for data backup in enterprise environments to minimize network and
storage overhead by detecting and eliminating redundancy among data blocks.
There are many deduplication schemes proposed by the research community.
Furthermore, deduplication is also widely adopted in practice such as Bitcasa,
Ciphertite and Dropbox. Convergent encryption [3] ensures data privacy in
deduplication, which was proposed for this special application without rigor-
ous security analysis. There are also several implementations of convergent
implementations of diﬀerent convergent encryption variants for secure dedu-
plication (e.g., [20–23]). Recently, Bellare et al. [14] formalized this primitive
as message-locked encryption, presented detailed and formal security analysis
for this notion. They deﬁned several new security deﬁnitions and adversary
model for this primitive and explore its application in space-eﬃcient secure
outsourced storage. The constructions described in [14] has been applied by
some commercial cloud storage providers, such as Bitcasa, also deploy con-
vergent encryption [14]. To further address the key-management problem in
deduplication system, Li et al. [18] proposed a new deduplication system by
distributing these keys across multiple servers after encrypting the ﬁles. The
storage of these convergent keys also uses the technique of deduplication such
that the storage and key management overhead at user side is reduced. Be-
cause of the weakness in convergent encryption, that is, the key is derived
directly and determinedly from the message itself, Bellare et al. [24] proposed
another method to improve the security by transforming the predictable mes-
sage into unpredictable message. In their system, a random secret key is further
added into the generation of ﬁle tag. In this way, the predicate ﬁles will be
unpredictable because of this random number. Stanek et al. [25] presented a
novel encryption scheme that provides diﬀerential security for popular data
and unpopular data. For popular data that are not particularly sensitive, the
traditional conventional encryption is performed. Another two-layered encryp-
tion scheme with stronger security while supporting deduplication is proposed
for unpopular data. In this way, they achieved better tradeoﬀ between the
eﬃciency and security of the outsourced data.
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There are also some work that present security attack on the deduplication
system based on the traditional convergent encryption. Harnik et al. [26] pre-
sented a number of attacks that can lead to data leakage in cloud storage
system supporting client-side deduplication. They observed that only a hash
value has been used in these system to realize the ownership proof to the
cloud storage server. As a result, the adversary can share these short val-
ues with other users and realize the content distribution attack. To prevent
these attacks, Halevi et al. [19] proposed the notion of “proofs of ownership”
(PoW) for deduplication systems, such that a client can eﬃciently prove to
the cloud storage server that he owns a ﬁle without uploading the ﬁle itself.
The technique is to use more entropy and longer proof to prevent the sharing.
Several PoW constructions based on the Merkle Hash Tree are proposed [19]
to enable client-side deduplication, which include the bounded leakage setting.
Pietro and Sorniotti [27] propose another eﬃcient PoW scheme by choosing
the projection of a ﬁle onto some randomly selected bit-positions as the ﬁle
proof. Xu et al. [28] also consider the data privacy and presented another
scheme in a bounded leakage setting. In order to prevent from brute-force
attack, Li et al. [17] proposed the notion of deduplication with privileges in
a hybrid cloud architecture. In this system, only authorized users are able to
send the valid request on the ﬁles with corresponding access policy.
Searchable encryption [11,29] has been widely studied in the context of cryp-
tography. Among those works, most are focused on eﬃciency improvements
and security deﬁnition formalizations. The ﬁrst construction of searchable en-
cryption was proposed by Song et al. [9], in which each word in the document
is encrypted independently under a special two-layered encryption construc-
tion. Goh [11] proposed to use Bloom ﬁlters to construct the indexes for the
data ﬁles. For each ﬁle, a Bloom ﬁlter containing trapdoors of all unique words
is built up and stored on the server. To search for a word, the user generates
the search request by computing the trapdoor of the word and sends it to the
server. Upon receiving the request, the server tests if any Bloom ﬁlter contains
the trapdoor of the query word and returns the corresponding ﬁle identiﬁers.
To achieve more eﬃcient search, Chang et al. [30] and Curtmola et al. [13]
both proposed similar “index” approaches, where a single encrypted hash ta-
ble index is built for the entire ﬁle collection. In the index table, each entry
consists of the trapdoor of a keyword and an encrypted set of ﬁle identiﬁers
whose corresponding data ﬁles contain the keyword. As a complementary ap-
proach, Boneh et al. [31] presented a public-key based searchable encryption
scheme, with an analogous scenario to that of [9]. In their construction, any-
one with the public key can write to the data stored on the server but only
authorized users with the private key can search. As an attempt to enrich
query predicates, conjunctive keyword search, subset query and range query
over encrypted data, have also been proposed in [29]. Note that all these ex-
isting schemes support only exact keyword search, and thus are not suitable
for Cloud Computing. Li et al. [6] presented a search scheme supporting fuzzy
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keyword match, which is critical in practical applications. They proposed two
methods to realize the fuzzy set for a keyword. However, all these works have
only considered the traditional keyword search over encrypted ﬁles without
supporting deduplication.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, for the ﬁrst time we formalize and solve the problem of sup-
porting eﬃcient yet privacy-preserving keyword search for encrypted data in
deduplication storage system. The convergent encryption has been utilized to
protect the conﬁdentiality of sensitive data while supporting deduplication.
This paper ﬁrstly proposed two keyword search constructions in this scenario
with diﬀerent index formats. The integrity of the uploaded ﬁles could also
be veriﬁed by the users after downloading and decryption without any other
traditional integrity auditing mechanisms. Furthermore, two advanced con-
structions on the deduplication supporting fuzzy keyword search and security
analysis demonstrates that our keyword search schemes are secure in terms of
the deﬁnitions speciﬁed in the proposed security model.
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